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Executive summary
Significant numbers of people have been the 
victim or nearly the victim of fraud. 
The characteristics of victims, however, do vary.  
Typologies distinguish differences in their 
knowledge of the fraud, the degree of co-operation 
and in the loss. 
The profile of victims also varies. For instance, mass 
marketing fraud does not attract one type of victim. 
Men, women, the old and the young tend to fall  
for different variations within this field of fraud. 
Another example is identity frauds where research 
suggests those 26-45 years old, working in a 
professional occupation, owner occupiers (usually 
in a detached house), earning over £50,000 (these 
are 3 times more likely to be victims), and Directors 
of companies are most at risk. 
Identity fraud is generally reported, but mass 
marketing fraud tends to have very low rate of 
reporting, often 1 to 3 per cent. 
There are a wide range of reasons for low reporting 
which include: the victim may not know they 
have been defrauded, they feel partly responsible, 
the embarrassment, the low financial loss, the 
ambiguity of the fraud, the attitude of statutory 
bodies and confusion, amongst others. 
There are also major impacts on victims because 
of the fraud. These include financial losses, loss of 
employment, emotional impacts, health problems, 
disintegration of the family, self blame and 
behavioural changes. 
The provision to support victims of fraud compared 
to other crimes is also much more pluralised and 
confusing for victims. 
There is also research to illustrate some of the 
things victims want, which include: individual case 
workers, been kept up-to-date with progress, a more 
sympathetic approach, better training of staff dealing 
with victims, better and clearer information, restitution 
and for the offender to be caught and punished. 
This review profiles a wide range of
frauds which affect individuals and  
small businesses. In particular, it looks 
at mass marketing, identity and small 
business fraud.
The review highlights the diversity within fraud 
including who perpetrates it. The report also 
shows the level of innovation and skill involved 
in committing fraud, thus coining the word 
‘scampreneurs’ to describe these criminals. 
There are a wide range of techniques used to 
commit frauds, which can be divided into four 
areas: victim selection techniques, perpetration 
strategies, detection avoiding strategies and 
securing the gains. The latter of which is beyond 
the scope of this review. 
Victim selection techniques include the use of  
both open and illicit sources of information to 
target individuals. Typical sources are publicly 
available marketing lists, directories as well as so 
called ‘suckers’ lists of those who have already  
fallen for a scam. 
Perpetration strategies vary according to the 
specific type of fraud but some of the most 
common include the use of sound business skills, 
the latest technology, promoting professional 
appearances, utilising ‘good’ sales techniques, 
seeking small sums of money and operating in a 
legal hinterland, amongst others. 
There are another wide range of techniques 
specific to identity fraud, ranging from stealing 
waste to secure personal information to the use 
of sophisticated software to hack into victims 
computers to steal personal data. 
Fraudsters also use a wide range of techniques to 
avoid detection. They often operate in jurisdictions 
where they are unlikely to be bothered by law 
enforcement. They move locations regularly to 
avoid detection as well as operating in a legal 
hinterland and seeking small sums of money. 
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Introduction
Fraud encompasses a wide range of
behaviours that are linked by trickery 
or deceit with the intention it will 
culminate in some form of gain.
It can range from ‘internal’ frauds where a 
previously law abiding employee exploits an 
opportunity to embezzle monies from his/
her company to ‘external’ frauds perpetrated by 
organised criminals on an industrial scale, such 
as stealing identities to secure loans. The passage 
of the recent Fraud Act 2006 has provided some 
clarity to the crime by defining most of the 
offences under: 
•	 Fraud	by	false	representation
•	 Fraud	by	failing	to	disclose	information
•	 Fraud	by	abuse	of	position
What is clear, however, is that fraud embraces a 
broad scope of different crimes. This is illustrated 
further by some of the attempts to produce 
typologies of the different types of fraud. One of 
the most comprehensive has been produced by 
Levi (2008a: 391) and is presented in Table 1. 
The list identified by Levi could be expanded with 
further categories and sub-divisions such is the 
breadth and diversity of fraud. However, the terms 
of reference for this review are clearly focused 
upon fraud against individuals and small firms with 
particular reference to the following four: 
•	 Mass	marketing	scams	
•	 Investment	frauds	
•	 Identity	fraud	
•	 Fraud	affecting	small	businesses	
Victim sector Victim subsector Examples of fraud
Private	 Financial	services	 Cheque	fraud
	 	 Counterfeit	intellectual
	 	 property	and	products		
	 	 sold	as	genuine
	 	 Counterfeit	money
	 	 Data-compromise	fraud
	 	 Embezzlement	
	 	 Insider	dealing/
	 	 market	abuse
	 	 Insurance	fraud	
	 	 Lending	fraud
	 	 Payment	card	fraud
	 	 Procurement	fraud
		 Non-financial		 Cheque	fraud
	 	 Counterfeit	intellectual
	 	 property	and	products		
	 	 sold	as	genuine
	 	 Counterfeit	money
	 	 Data-compromise	fraud
	 	 Embezzlement	
	 	 Gaming	fraud
	 	 Lending	fraud
	 	 Payment	card	fraud
	 	 Procurement	fraud
	 Individuals	 Charity	fraud
	 	 Consumer	fraud
	 	 Counterfeit	intellectual
	 	 property	and	products		
	 	 sold	as	genuine
	 	 Counterfeit	money
	 	 Investment	fraud
	 	 Pension-type	fraud
Public	 National	bodies	 Benefit	fraud
	 	 Embezzlement	
	 	 Procurement	fraud
	 	 Tax	fraud
	 Local	bodies	 Embezzlement	
	 	 Frauds	on	Council	taxes	
	 	 Procurement	fraud
	 International	bodies		 Procurement	fraud
	 (but	affecting	the		 (by	national	against	other
	 public)	 –	mainly	but	not	always	
	 	 foreign	–	companies	to
	 	 	obtain	foreign	contracts)
	 	 EU	funds	fraud
Table 1 
Levi’s typology of fraud by victim
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The rest of this review will be dedicated to the 
growing literature that has been published on 
each of these frauds within the parameters set 
by the NFA. It is important to note, however, that 
compared to many other crimes, fraud is relatively 
neglected by researchers (Levi, 2008b). The focus 
of the review is the UK, but acknowledges the 
breadth of information published in North America 
and Australia, amongst other countries. There is 
much that can be learnt from this literature given 
the sometimes common structural conditions and 
the increasingly global nature of fraud. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that the characteristics 
of fraud in other countries can’t always be applied 
directly to the UK without changes. 
This review will begin by examining the range of 
fraud that falls under the four categories. It will also 
give a brief overview of the fraudsters themselves 
and an exploration of the techniques used. In the 
second part of the review typologies of victims will 
be outlined, followed by a profile of certain types. 
The review will also examine why there is such low 
reporting and the impact of fraud upon the victims. 
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The frauds to be considered in
this review are diverse and can be 
differentiated further. This section 
seeks to do this by drawing upon the 
literature available. It then moves on 
to examine the characteristics of the 
fraudsters and the techniques used  
to carry out the frauds. 
Mass marketing scams 
There is no commonly accepted single definition 
of what is a ‘mass marketing scam’. Such scams – or 
consumer frauds – generally fall into four categories: 
• Pretending to sell something you do not have, 
and taking the money. 
• Supplying goods or services which are of lower 
quality than those paid for, or failing to supply  
the goods and services sought. 
• Persuading customers to buy something they 
do not really want through oppressive marketing 
techniques. 
• Disguising one’s identity in order to perpetrate 
a fraud (Verniero and Herr, 1997, cited in Muscat 
et al, 2002: 1). 
The Office of Fair Trading (2006: 12) has attempted 
to produce a definition of mass marketing fraud as, 
“A misleading or deceptive business practice
where you receive an unsolicited or uninvited 
contact (for example by e-mail, letter, phone,  
or ad) and false promises are made to con 
you out of money.”
There are, of course, many other types of scams 
perpetrated on a one-to-one basis, but the focus 
here will be those initiated through mass marketing 
(see, Vaughan and Carlo, 1975; and Morton, and 
Bateson, 2007). There are a very wide range of  
these types of scams and such is the ingenuity  
of fraudsters new scams are always emerging. 
Some of those that have been perpetrated which 
have been identified by OFT – which do not fall 
into the investment category – will now be briefly 
described. They have been divided into: gambling 
scams, money making scams and bogus services 
and products (later in appendix 2 the extent and 
costs of each type of fraud is considered), for ease 
of reference.
Gambling scams 
There are a variety of scams where the victim is 
invited to become involved in lotteries and other 
gambling orientated schemes. 
1. Prize draw and sweepstake scams 
Fraudsters send out letters and emails to potential 
victims telling them they have won a prize or are 
entitled to a financial reward, but they need to pay 
a small ‘administrative’ fee to secure access to the 
funds. 
2. Foreign lottery scams 
These are similar to the above in that victims are 
told they have won a prize in an overseas lottery 
and they need to pay an ‘administration’ fee or tax 
to receive the monies. Again, these are perpetrated 
via mail, e-mail and sometimes the victims are also 
asked to contact an ‘agent’ by telephone. 
3. Bogus tipsters
A variety of bogus tipster scams have been 
identified. Some will send out glossy brochures 
and charge fees for tips claimed to be secured 
from ‘inside’ information and often guaranteeing 
winnings for members. In reality, they often have 
no specialist knowledge. 
Literature review
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4. Premium rate and telephone prize scams 
Victims receive a letter, text or automated phone 
call telling them they have won a prize, but they 
need to telephone a premium rate phone line to 
claim it. This call lasts several minutes and they 
invariably end up with a prize worth less than the 
cost of the call or nothing at all. 
Money-making scams
There are a variety of scams that offer the victim 
the potential to make ‘easy’ money. 
1. Work at home and business 
opportunity scams 
Fraudsters advertise work opportunities via 
newspapers, magazines, shop windows and even 
lamp posts that require few skills/qualifications,  
but claim to provide above average financial 
rewards. The fraudsters secure monies through up 
front fees to enable the victim to become involved, 
but, in reality, there is no paid work. Common jobs 
include stuffing envelopes, home assembly kits and 
home directories. 
2. Pyramid selling and chain letter scams
Through letters, emails, websites, the Internet, 
advertisements people are enticed into a scheme 
for a fee, which promises high returns if they recruit 
more people. In reality, only a few at the top of the 
pyramid make money. 
3. Internet matrix scams 
Similar to pyramid investment schemes, they 
operate via adverts on the web offering free gifts. 
After buying a product a person goes on a waiting 
list to receive a gift once a prescribed number  
of others have also signed up, which encourages 
recruitment. There are always more members  
than gifts. 
Bogus products and services 
There are also a variety of scams where bogus 
products and services are sold. 
1. Miracle health and slimming cure scams	
‘Miracle’ health cures for a very wide range of  
health conditions from obesity, impotence to 
cancer are advertised through mail or e-mail for 
ineffective and potentially dangerous products. 
2. Clairvoyant and psychic mailing scams 
Targets receive a letter from a clairvoyant or psychic 
that for a small fee offers to make predictions. 
Sometimes they are told something bad will 
happen to them, their family or friends 
if they do not participate. 
3. Bogus holiday club scams
Under these frauds a person is approached in the 
street (often on holiday) or phoned and told they 
have won a holiday, but they need to attend a 
presentation to receive it. At the presentation they 
are subjected to high pressure sales techniques 
and end up paying for extras. 
4. Career opportunity scams 
Under these scams, like the bogus business 
opportunities, potential victims are recruited via 
advertising to a variety of activities that could 
enhance their careers. These include schemes to 
publish books, to attend conferences, to patent and 
market inventions and to become models or actors 
for which the victim has to pay a fee. 
5. Loan scams 
Fraudsters advertise fake loans in newspapers for 
which victims are made to pay an ‘insurance fee’ 
upfront. 
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Illicit scams 
Scams set up to appear like an illegal activity 
looking for accomplices. 
1. African advanced fee frauds/ 
foreign making scams
Fraudsters use mail, e-mail or faxes to target 
potential victims with usually a fictitious scenario of 
a corrupt government official who has ‘procured’ a 
large sum money and who needs a bank account 
to place it. Often a fee is sought to help facilitate 
the transfer as well as sometimes the  
bank accounts of victims have been targeted.
Technological trick scams
Under these types of scams the victim is tricked 
into doing something which hides the fraudster’s 
technological trick, which results in the payment 
of a premium rate without the victim’s knowledge. 
1. Internet dialler scams 
Fraudsters send out emails or create pop up boxes 
on websites, which when downloaded or clicked 
upon downloads software that changes their 
Internet settings. This then links the person to the 
Internet through a premium telephone line, which 
the victim is often unaware of until they receive 
their bill. 
Other scams 
There was also evidence that some scammers are 
moving into online dating sites where they create 
fictional profiles for the purposes of securing 
monies from the victim (Consumer Direct, n.d.). 
There are also a wide range of other scams that 
are perpetrated, many using less ‘industrial’ scale 
communications (see Morton and Bateson, 2007). 
For example, tradesmen who charge excessive fees 
to do home improvements which are shoddy or 
even non-existent. Many of this type of tradesmen 
will call door-to-door or distribute leaflets to 
potential victims. There are also tradesmen who 
may even advertise. Vaughan and Carlo’s (1975) 
study of the appliance repairman provides a  
picture of long-term fraud over several years of a 
person unable to do many of the duties regarding 
repair of appliances that he was paid to do. A range 
of TV programmes have emerged publicising these 
types of ‘rogue traders’.
Investment frauds 
There are many parallels between the mass 
marketing scams and some investment frauds. 
Indeed the OFT (2006) report cited above covers 
some investment frauds alongside scams. 
1. High risk investments 
Consumers are contacted via letter, e-mail 
or telephone and invited to participate in an 
investment scheme that is to be very lucrative. 
The investments are for shares, fine wine, 
gemstones, and art amongst many other 
opportunities. In reality, the ‘investments’ are 
worthless or very over-priced. 
2. Property investment schemes 
Fraudsters advertise or send out glossy brochures 
that invite prospective ‘investors’ to attend a 
presentation where they will learn how to make 
money from the property market. They are then 
pressured into joining for a fee or to buy ‘future’ 
properties at a discount. Variations on this also 
seek to entice investors into the buy-to-let market 
for non-existent properties or those in serious 
disrepair. 
3. Ponzi
A Ponzi fraud is where a fraudster sets up what 
appears to be a legitimate investment scheme 
with usually above average rates of return. In reality 
the fraudster is skimming off a slice of the money 
and using the rest to pay the returns. Their survival 
inevitably depends upon bringing new investors 
into the scheme, so that eventually it will collapse.
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4. Market abuse 
There is some literature on the American stock 
market that exposes some of the frauds and sharp 
practices perpetrated to manipulate the prices of 
legitimate stocks traded through the main stock 
markets. Often this abuse is focused upon so called 
‘penny stocks’ with companies where much less 
information is in the public domain and where it is 
easier to manipulate the market. The Internet and 
e-mail have made the task of those operating in 
this area much easier. Some of the most common 
practices used include spreading false rumours 
through the Internet, discussion forums and e-mail 
which are likely to encourage greater demand for a 
stock and thus increasing its price and then selling 
before the rumours are exposed. The practice is 
known as ‘pump and dump’ (Walker and Levine, 
2001). The victims in these cases are left with stock 
they have paid a premium for which has lost its 
value based upon false rumours. 
Identity frauds
Identity fraud is to be distinguished from ‘identity 
theft’ where the victim’s identity is permanently 
appropriated (Semmens, 1999). 
Far more common are the various types of identity 
fraud, which involves unlawfully using another 
person’s details for gain or to avoid an obligation 
(Pascoe et al, 2006). This type of fraud can cover 
a large range of scams that vary in their use of 
the other person’s details. Identity fraud has been 
defined by the Home Office Identity Fraud Steering 
Committee (n.d.) as: 
“… when a false identity or someone else’s 
identity details are used to support unlawful 
activity, or when someone avoids obligation/
liability by falsely claiming that he/she was the 
victim of identity fraud.”
“ Identity fraud involves the use of an individual
or a company’s identity information to open 
accounts, fraudulently obtain social security 
benefits, (in the case of individuals), apply for 
credit and/or obtain goods and services.
“ Identity fraud can be described as the use 
of that stolen identity in criminal activity  
to obtain goods or services by deception.  
Stealing an individual’s identity does not, 
on its own, constitute identity fraud and this  
is an important distinction.”
Below provides a rudimentary list of how identity 
fraud is perpetrated, from using a stolen credit card 
to the complete theft of a person’s identity. 
1. Lost or stolen cards/documents
This is where fraudsters use cards/documents 
stolen or lost from the victim to obtain goods and 
services. 
2. Card-not-present
This is where a fraudster secures enough 
information from a victim’s bank account details to 
make payments on the telephone, via the Internet, 
emails etc. 
3. Counterfeit cards/documents
This is where fraudsters counterfeit existing cards/
documents and uses them to obtain goods and 
services in the victim’s name. 
4. Account takeover 
This is where a fraudster takes over the account 
of a legitimate customer and uses monies/credit 
facilities in them. 
5. Creation of new accounts, loans etc
Fraudsters use the personal details of a victim to 
create bank accounts and apply for credit. 
6. Identity theft
The fraudster takes on the identity of a person 
permanently. 
The more sophisticated identity frauds are where 
information is used to secure ‘breeder’ documents 
such as birth certificates, driving licences etc. These 
often lead to multiple applications for store and 
credit cards, loans, benefits etc to secure credit 
that is never going to be paid back (Newman and 
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McNally, 2005). These frauds are usually temporary 
as the real person invariably finds out with bills for 
goods never received or a failure to secure credit, 
due to a credit record they are unaware of. The 
model of the process of identity fraud, set out by 
Gordon and Wilcox (2003: 19), illustrates how the 
crime is perpetrated. 
 
Figure 1
The Identity Fraud Process
Fraudulent	identifiers
ficticious	or	stolen
Provides	access	to	a	breeder	documentation	
eg:	birth	certificate
Allows	procurement	of	documents	
such	as:
Creates	credible	identity	and	access	to:
Enables	criminal	activity	for:
Profit Terrorism
Driver’s	licence Passport Social	security	card
Employment Credit	cards Bank	accounts Secure	facilities Computer	systems
Leases/	
mortgages
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Frauds against small businesses 
Small businesses face many of the frauds  
identified above as well as others. They may deal 
with internal fraud from their employees (Doig, 
2006) or external fraud such as long firm frauds 
perpetrated by other ‘firms’ (Levi, 2008b). There 
are also scams particularly targeted upon small 
businesses. These include false invoices submitted 
for payment, sales of entries or advertisement in 
non-existent newsletters or directories. Therefore 
for the purposes of this review some of the 
most common frauds perpetrated against small 
businesses will be reviewed. The Federation of 
Small Businesses (FSB) has published research 
illustrating the main fraud risks (2009). 
1. Corporate identity fraud 
The FSB survey found that 6 per cent of their 
respondents, who were all small businesses, had 
experienced corporate identity fraud. The common 
thefts were of IP and e-mail addresses which were 
then often used to commit frauds. These might 
be where legitimate clients of the company are 
redirected to pay funds into alternative accounts or to 
undertake phishing activities to secure the personal 
data of clients to undertake frauds against them. 
2. Card-not-present fraud 
A significant problem for many businesses is this 
type of fraud. Many goods and services are bought 
over the telephone, via the Internet or fax via the 
details on the card, rather than presentation of the 
actual cards themselves. Many fraudsters are able 
to secure the details on the card, even though 
they don’t have the card itself and use these to 
order goods and services. Unlike cardholders, 
businesses can secure all the appropriate numbers 
from the buyer. However, if it transpires that the 
buyers details are fraudulent they are still liable to 
a chargeback, where they lose the money gained, 
as well as the goods and services sold. The FSB 
found that 29 per cent of respondents had been a 
victim of this type of crime. Research on Australian 
small businesses has also found this to be a major 
problem (Charlton and Taylor, 2004). 
Perpetrators of frauds
Before some of the techniques used by fraudsters 
are explored, it would be useful to briefly discuss 
the literature on the perpetrators of frauds. 
There is only limited data available. Even the law 
enforcement community does not always know 
the background of the perpetrators. There is also 
an ongoing debate as to the extent of involvement 
of ‘organised criminals’ in the various types of 
fraud explored in this review – not withstanding 
the challenges of defining this concept (see, Van 
Duyne, 1996). Levi (2008b: 89) has distinguished 
a category of fraudsters relating to long firm 
fraudsters, which can also be applied to other types 
of fraud (Levi, 2008a). These are: 
Slippery slope
Individuals who generally have no prior convictions 
and fall into frauds through pressures combined 
with identification of opportunities. 
Intermediate long firm fraudsters
People with prior convictions who started off with 
legitimate intentions, but eventually turn to fraud. 
Pre-planned long firm fraudsters
The perpetrators start with the purpose of fraud  
 and generally have past criminal convictions 
although may use ‘front’ people without 
convictions. Some may be involved in organised 
crime in the ‘traditional’ sense: ie. drugs, 
racketeering etc, or links to them or may focus 
solely on certain types of frauds. 
Many of these pre-planned type fraudsters will 
often use those without traditional criminal 
backgrounds to perpetrate their frauds. 
Telemarketing frauds often utilise people with no 
prior criminal background who have come from 
white collar jobs. Technological requirements of 
some internet based frauds may require those with 
IT backgrounds. 
Certain groups have also been identified as 
associated with particular types of frauds. Nigerians 
Fraud typologies and victims of fraud
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and other West Africans have become associated 
with the 419 scams, but Smith et al (1999) have also 
suggested the involvement of Nigerians in credit 
card fraud, identity card fraud, forgery, immigration 
fraud as well. Many internet based frauds – often 
involving phishing – have been linked to Eastern 
European criminal groups in Russia, Romania, 
Lithuania to name a few (Levi, 2008a). 
The ‘Scampreneur’
The wide range of scams pursued by fraudsters, 
combined with their innovation in type and 
techniques used marks many out for their 
entrepreneurial skill – unfortunately misdirected 
into fraud. Entrepreneurs have been the subject 
of much research and some of the characteristics 
that define them include: risk taking, the need to 
achieve, the need to be the locus of control,  
over-optimism and the desire for autonomy  
(Carter and Jones-Evans, 2006). These traits are 
central to a successful scammer or ‘scampreneur’. 
Indeed the declining economic conditions from 
2008 onwards have already led some to move 
their operations towards the changing economic 
conditions, such as fake training opportunities 
targeted at the unemployed. ‘Scampreneur’ would 
therefore seem to be an appropriate title for many 
of them. Levi (2008b: 392) has sought to outline  
the process of frauds, which can be adapted 
utilising the literature on scams to demonstrate 
their business model. 
The model starts with the identification of a 
potential opportunity. As the earlier section of 
this review revealed there are a very wide range 
of different types of fraud that can be pursued by 
the fraudster. Also, there needs to be a motivated 
fraudster and this might be a career, organised 
fraudster or simply a normally law abiding person 
who has turned to fraud for whatever reason. 
Once a potential fraud has been found, a potential 
victim needs to be identified. If the fraud involves 
mass marketing then the next stage requires the 
appropriate resources, labour and organisational 
skills to perpetrate it. The scampreneur also needs 
to pursue strategies to avoid detection. Finally, any 
proceeds from the fraud then need to be secured 
and the money laundered. This will all usually 
require contacts and expertise. 
Figure 2
The ‘Scampreneur’ business model 
Opportunity	to	commit	fraud
Motivated	fraudster(s)
Identify	potential	victims
Perpetrate	fraud
(need	for	resources,	labour	and	organisation	etc)
Avoid	detection
Secure	gains	
(need	for	contacts,	expertise	in	this	area)
It would now seem appropriate to explore the 
techniques of fraudsters. 
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The techniques of fraudsters 
The growing literature upon different types of fraud 
provides much information on the techniques of 
fraudsters. These diverse range of tactics used will 
be considered under three sub-headings, victim 
selection techniques, perpetration strategies and 
finally detection avoiding strategies. There is also 
a fourth category of securing the gains, but this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Victim selection techniques 
The earlier section on different types of victims 
revealed a wide range of strategies fraudsters use 
to contact their victims. These can range from 
one-to-one, mail, telephone, e-mail, Internet to 
advertisements. Some of the methods linked to 
these will now be explored. 
1. Potential victim lists
Mass marketing scams, using addresses (mail 
and e-mail) and telephone numbers, often use 
legitimate lists that are available to all businesses. 
Open source information such as telephone 
directories, list of shareholders, names of 
company directors, are used as well as legitimate 
marketing lists sold to businesses for specific 
market segments. For example fake lottery scams 
may make use of known lists of consumers 
who participate in lotteries. Fraudsters may also 
purchase so called ‘suckers’ lists which contain the 
details of those previously fallen for a scam (Smith 
et al 1999; Shover et al, 2003). Methods used to 
generate spam mail that go to multiple e-mail 
addresses are also used by identity fraudsters 
undertaking phishing attacks. 
Identity fraudsters have also been known to utilise 
open source information of certain groups of 
people to perpetrate frauds. For example company 
directors have to supply a range of personal data, 
including personal addresses, which is openly 
available via Companies House. These people 
are also generally better off in terms of income. 
Company directors have disproportionately 
become the victims of identity fraud (Pascoe, 
et al, 2006; Experian, 2008). Some people also 
publicise information about themselves on social 
networking websites such as Facebook, which can 
then be exploited (Aleem, 2007). Illicit information 
may also be traded by corrupt employees or 
persons who have stolen the personal details of 
potential victims from an organisation. 
Thus, to summarise potential victim lists are drawn 
from the following: 
• Open source directories/databases (phone book, 
lists of directors, shareholders, etc)
• Marketing lists (known purchasers of lotteries, 
health products etc)
• Illicit lists (suckers, personal information) 
2. Affinity groups
A common selection technique of Ponzi schemes 
is to target affinity groups. These are groups who 
work together, attend the same place of religious 
worship, or are members of clubs. The tactic is 
to get one person hooked who then discusses 
their above average returns with the aim that 
they will spread the word leading to further 
recruits. Evidence from the USA has suggested a 
disproportionate number of these frauds occur 
amongst church-affiliated groups (Ganzini et al 
1990). The Madoff Ponzi scam was also targeted at 
the very rich and famous as an affinity group. 
3. Targeted advertising 
There are a number of scams that simply advertise 
in appropriate publications encouraging potential 
victims to respond. For example, bogus tipsters will 
advertise in the racing press. 
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Perpetration strategies
 
This review has demonstrated the diversity of 
frauds. Therefore, it is also not surprising to find 
huge variations in the techniques used, once a 
victim has been identified, to secure their monies. 
It is useful to divide these between core techniques 
common to almost every type of scam to more 
specialised techniques. The latter are mapped in 
appendix 1 against the different types of frauds 
considered in this review. 
Core techniques 
1. Business skills and contacts 
Almost all the scams under consideration in this 
review require the fraudster to have good general 
business skills and contacts (Levi, 2008). To set up 
a mass marketing operation using mail, the web 
or telephones requires good organisational skills. 
To secure appropriate lists, scripts for scams etc 
may also require good networks, frequently with 
criminal groups. Once monies are received skills in 
laundering it or access to networks that can help 
are also required. 
Specific techniques 
1. Use of appropriate and latest technology 
A scam artist is committing malpractice if he’s 
not using the Internet (Danner, 2000 cited in 
Lagenderfer and Shimp, 2001: 764).
Many of the perpetrators make use of the latest 
technology to undertake their scams. Some of 
the identity fraudsters use sophisticated software, 
develop programmes and special gadgets to 
manufacture and copy cards. Central to many 
scams is the use of the Internet. It has opened up 
many traditional small-scale scams to the mass 
market. There are more mundane technologies 
used to perpetrate scams, such as the mail and 
telephones. 
2. Professional and legitimate appearance 
The research by the OFT (2006) on mass 
marketing scams demonstrates that in many of 
the frauds a significant factor in their success 
was the professional and legitimate appearance 
of what enticed them into the fraud, such as, 
advertisement, e-mail, letter, brochure, telephone 
call, presentation etc. Other research has found 
the credibility of names to be important in 
investment schemes (Shichor et al, 2001), accents 
of salesmen/women in telemarketing, quality of 
documentation/brochures etc (Shichor et al, 2001). 
Conversely Grabosky and Duffield (2001) have 
identified some of the ‘red flags’ that raise warnings 
to a potential risk of fraud. Many of these are the 
opposite of the above in that they convey a lack 
of professionalism and illegitimacy. They point to 
factors such as over familiarity, undue pressure 
to pay, very low prices, very high returns claimed, 
lack of official documentations/authorisations to 
name some. Downs et al (2006) have also identified 
how mistakes in phishing emails can lead to some 
identifying it as high risk. Although, they also found, 
people didn’t always recognise these clues. 
3. Illegitimate appearance 
The other side of legitimate and professional 
appearance of some scams are the frauds that,  
if they had been real, would incite illegal activity.  
The Nigerian 419 scams are prominent in this 
category as if the transaction had been real the 
victim would have been involved in corruption, 
fraud, money laundering amongst many other 
potential crimes. Therefore by securing their 
involvement in what appears to be an illegal 
activity it makes it more difficult and embarrassing 
for the victim to report the fraud (Smith et all 
1999; Tive, 2006). This is exacerbated when threats 
of intimidation and violence are added to the 
combination that by perception or reality the 
victim is dealing with organised criminals. 
Literature review
17
The characteristics  
of frauds 
4. Small sums of money sought 
The OFT (2006) research illustrates that in many 
of the frauds relatively small sums of money are 
lost – frequently less than £100. The tactic of the 
fraudster is to secure such a sum of money that 
the victim will be less bothered to report the fraud 
(Langenderfer and Shimp, 2001). 
5. Good sales techniques 
Central to many scams of this type are very good 
sales skills (Levi, 2008b). Many of the ‘boiler rooms’ 
also take on the structures of legitimate call centres 
that deploy sales expertise according to skill. 
For example Shover et al (2003) drawing upon 
interviews with 47 criminal telemarketers in the 
USA found three key types of roles: 
• Sales agents: who make the first calls with a 
scripted pitch and identify potential victims. 
• Closers: who are more experienced, and then 
take on the role. 
• Reloaders: who are the most experienced and 
maintain contact with those already defrauded  
to secure more monies from them. 
Sometimes the victims, who are often vulnerable, 
are also subjected to high pressure sales where 
they are contacted multiple times with the 
purpose of signing them up (Shichor et al, 
2001). An American survey found some victims 
‘besieged by telemarketers’ (AARP, 1996 cited in 
Titus and Gover, 2001: 143). Further, Schichor et 
al (2001) in a survey of victims of one investment 
scam, found that 82.3 per cent had reservations 
about the scheme when contacted, but such was 
the persuasiveness of the sales agents they still 
participated. 
6. Selling a dream 
Central to sales based frauds is ‘selling a dream’. 
The fraudster offers something someone wants at 
a low price or something that promises to make 
the victim above average returns. As Titus (1999: 4) 
argues, ‘The lure of something free, absurdly cheap 
or unrealistically lucrative, is integral to many fraud 
“come ons”.’ For example, fraudsters offer work with 
few skills that pay above average, loans to persons 
who would never secure one from a bona fide 
provider, investment returns fund managers could 
only dream of. They play on the needs of certain 
groups of individuals and with their slick sales skills 
sell them the dream. 
Lagenderfer and Shimp (2001) argue that many 
scammers play on the visceral influences. That is, 
those desires that have a hedonistic impact such as 
sexual desire, greed, fear etc. Many decisions based 
upon these needs are often made with limited 
or no cognitive deliberation, but after time these 
desires often wane. This is why many scammers 
often seek instant responses. 
7. Operating in legal hinterland
Many of the frauds operate in a legal hinterland 
where the tactics they use make it difficult to 
unambiguously identify it as fraud. This makes 
some ‘victims’ adamant that they are not victims 
of fraud; others, even though they recognise it 
probably was a fraud, are less likely to report it 
because of the perceived ambiguity; and another 
group who may be conscious it is a fraud, want to 
report it, but because of the ambiguity face a law 
enforcement community unwilling to take it on 
or passing it on to other agencies. For example, 
some lotteries do pay out prizes and consequently 
the reaction of many police forces who receive 
complaints is that it is a ‘civil matter’ between the 
victim and lottery. Some scams also have very 
small print contradicting the main message of the 
scam. Fraudsters play on this and even if the law 
enforcement community does become interested 
they claim the dispute is a civil matter and of no 
interest to the police (Shover et al, 2003). 
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8. Intimidation and threats of violence
Most mass marketing and investment scams take 
place with no threats of violence or intimidation. 
However, there are a few exceptions. The Nigerian 
advanced fee frauds in some cases, once a victim 
is drawn in, sometimes deploy threats of violence 
and intimidation to ensure their continued 
participation. For example, Smith et al (1999: 3) 
found evidence of one fax to a victim: 
“… to inform you to produce a mandatory sum 
of US$35,000 only, into our account given 
below in Switzerland within ninety six hours, 
alternatively you will kidnapped and forced  
to commit suicide during the period of our  
on-coming anniversary of fifty years [sic].”
Some of the clairvoyant and psychic mailing scams 
also play on fear, by threatening bad luck, health 
problems etc on those (or their families and friends) 
who refuse to participate. 
9. Identity fraud techniques 
There are a wide range of techniques used by 
identity fraudsters that deserve consideration 
in their own right. The fraudster requires either 
genuine identity documents, such as a passport, 
driver’s licence, credit card or selective personal 
information such as name, address, date of birth, 
bank account numbers, national insurance number 
to name the most prominent. Depending upon 
the fraud the fraudster might hijack the victims 
account and/or apply for credit cards, loans etc. 
9.1. Redirection of mail
One of the most common techniques used in 
identity fraud is the redirection of the mail of a 
victim to an alternative address. This accounts for 
36 per cent of identity fraud (Experian, 2008). Using 
this technique requires careful planning. There are 
also more opportunistic fraudsters who simply 
steal mail by acquiring the mail of a housemate or 
a previous occupier of an address. As soon as they 
are able to control the mail they can then use the 
victim’s identity to apply for credit cards, order mail 
order goods etc. 
9.2. ‘Jackal’ fraud
In this type of fraud a deceased person’s identity  
is used to secure credit, goods and services 
(Experian, 2008). It is known as ‘Jackal’ fraud from 
the film ‘The Day of the Jackal’ where the assassin 
assumes the identity of a long deceased child to 
apply for a passport. 
9.3. Theft of personal information 
Some identity frauds are based upon much more 
basic strategies. For example a wallet or purse 
stolen in a burglary, theft, or some other crime 
might contain official documents that are sold 
to a fraudster or used by the original criminal to 
assume the identity of the victim, for the purposes 
of securing credit, goods and/or services  
(Allison et al, 2005). 
9.4. Dumpster diving 
Another relatively simple approach – although 
slightly messier method – is simply stealing a 
person’s rubbish with the hope they have left 
personal information in it such as bank statements, 
utility bills, etc which can then be used to assume 
that person’s identity for the purpose of fraud 
(Allison et al, 2005). 
9.5. ‘Skimming’ 
‘Skimming’ is a more sophisticated means of 
stealing a person’s identity. It is when a person 
presents a credit or debit card to a corrupt cashier 
who also swipes the card to copy the data on it. 
That can then be used to make a copy. Ideally for 
the fraudster there will also be some means to 
identify what the person’s PIN number is although 
this is not essential (Allison et al, 2005). 
Literature review
19
The characteristics  
of frauds 
9.6. Pretext calling (social engineering)
Some fraudsters will pretend to be someone they 
are not, to secure bank account and other personal 
data. This often is known as pretext calling or social 
engineering. It can be done in person, over the 
telephone or most commonly through e-mail. The 
most common approach are the so called phishing 
emails, where a person receives an e-mail from 
what looks to be their bank or some other official 
body that seeks the personal information of the 
person. Some of the emails use the logos of the 
financial institutions and look very professional.  
At a less sophisticated level the fraudster might  
just telephone potential victims pretending to  
be a financial institution to secure the information 
they require. 
9.7. Trojans
The more sophisticated identity fraudsters 
sometimes send out ‘trojans’, so called because 
what may seem like a legitimate e-mail, website, 
pop-up box actually hides a computer virus.  
Once the virus is installed via opening a mail, 
clicking on a pop up or downloading a site, it  
sends data to the fraudster on login names, 
passwords etc which are then used to target 
legitimate accounts (Bank Safe Online, 2009). 
9.8 Hackers 
Some of the more sophisticated fraudsters may 
also have the capacity to ‘hack’ into certain 
organisation’s computers which then gives them 
access to the personal data they need to commit 
fraud (Newman and McNally, 2005). 
9.9 Corruption and incompetence
Personal information on individuals and 
businesses is also sometimes secured through a 
corrupt employee passing the information on or 
occasionally sheer incompetence (Newman and 
McNally, 2005). There have been a number of high 
profile losses of personal data in the UK through 
incompetence such as the personal details of all 
child benefit claimants in the UK. 
Detection avoidance strategies
Fraudsters also use a wide range of techniques to 
minimize the risk of getting caught. Some of the 
strategies used will now be considered. 
1. ‘Rip and tear’ 
Many boiler room based fraudsters are mobile  
and do not stay in a location very long  
(Hines, 2001). They will set up in a place for a 
period of time and initiate intensive targeting of 
potential victims and then move on before the 
local law enforcement community become alerted 
to their operation. This tactic is often called ‘rip 
and tear’ (Shover et al, 2003). In some cases ‘boiler 
rooms’ will bring in local sales staff – who may not 
even know it is a scam (Stevenson, 1998) – and 
frequently these are the only staff left when the 
law enforcement community turn up, not the 
organisers (Hines, 2001). 
2. Operation from regimes with limited police 
interest/weak sentencing 
Many of the mass marketing scams operate in 
countries where there is limited police interest 
or if caught the sentencing regime is light. Spain 
is commonly cited as a source of many boiler 
room scams. This is often put down to a lack of 
interest by the Spanish authorities given that the 
fraudsters do not attack Spanish citizens on their 
own doorstep. In Canada the reason is often laid at 
the feet of what some believe are light sentencing 
laws should a fraudster be caught, compared to the 
neighbouring USA where sentences, if caught,  
are very harsh. 
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3. Making reporting unlikely 
Fraudsters often pursue frauds for low sums of 
money that make reporting to the authorities 
unlikely by the victim (Hines, 2001). They also 
operate scams so they are or are perceived to be in 
legal hinterlands making reports less likely and law 
enforcement involvement less likely if contacted. 
Some frauds also pose jurisdictional challenges, 
meaning it is unclear where a victim should report 
or who has responsibility for investigating it. As 
Starnes (1996: 2006) argues: 
“… many operators of fraudulent schemes slip
through the cracks in state or federal statutes,  
or create new schemes to fall outside the scope 
of statutes.”
Now the nature and techniques of frauds have 
been considered it would be appropriate to 
examine the research on victims. 
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Victims of fraud have been largely
neglected by the broader community  
of scholars studying victimology 
(Shichor et al, 2001). This is despite 
evidence of the widespread risk of fraud. 
In the USA, for example, a nationwide 
survey for the National Institute of 
Justice found 58 per cent have been a 
victim of a fraud or attempted fraud 
(cited by Deem, 2000: 34). In the UK the 
OFT (2006) have estimated 48 per cent of 
the population have been targeted with 
a scam and 8 per cent would admit to 
being a victim of one. With the growth of 
phishing emails and other scam e-mail 
it would be fair to assume that these 
figures – at least in attempts – are  
much higher. 
There has, however, been some research on the 
victims of fraud in recent years in North America 
and Australia, as well as the UK. Much of the research 
has highlighted the parallels of the perception and 
treatment of fraud victims to rape victims – as the 
victims are often thought by legal authorities to 
be partly to blame (Shichor et al 2001; Levi, 2008a). 
There is often a view of victims of fraud that they  
are partly to blame and that you can’t con an honest 
man (or woman) (Van Wyk and Benson, 1997). 
Indeed, Delord-Raynal (1983, cited in Titus and 
Gover, 2001) goes as far as arguing some victims  
are co-conspirators in the crime. 
Victim typologies 
There are a diverse range of issues covered vis-à-vis 
the research on victims of fraud. Before some of it 
is considered it would be useful to make one major 
observation on fraud victims. As the earlier part of 
this review demonstrated there are numerous types 
of frauds. Similarly there are a wide range of different 
types of victims, therefore it is difficult to generalise. 
A good analogy is the case of cancer victims. There 
are a large number of cancers affecting a wide 
range of different groups. They are all called cancer 
but the victims and how they became victims are 
very diverse. The following section will illustrate the 
wide diversity of fraud victims. However, like cancer 
victims, when it is broken down into distinct frauds 
and scams some patterns become more observable. 
Profile by Knowledge
Figure 3
Profile of victims by knowledge
Unknowing
victims
Knowing	
victims		
Don’t	report
Knowing	
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Unbelieving	
victims
The first observation of note is that there are many 
‘unknowing’ victims of fraud. Such is the nature 
of some frauds many fall for them and unless 
contacted by a law enforcement agency would 
never know they have been defrauded. The best 
examples of these are some of the lottery and fake 
charity scams. Many people enter lotteries knowing 
winning is unlikely. Therefore, not receiving a prize 
is not an indication of fraud to them. Similarly, some 
people who give to charities may never learn it was 
in fact a scam (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2006). 
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Most scams, however, do eventually result in the 
victim finding out and ‘knowing’. These can be 
divided between those who report and those who 
don’t. Some of the reasons for non-reporting will 
be considered later in this section. There are also, 
however, the ‘unbelieving’ victims who are so taken 
in by a scam they will not believe it is one. For 
example the researchers were informed of some 
victims of investment frauds who were told at the 
point of payment by their financial institutions that 
it was a scam, but who thought they were merely 
frustrating their chances of making a ‘killing’ on 
an investment. These and many victims of mass 
marketing fraud have been termed what is known  
as ‘chronic victims’, responding to multiple requests 
by the scammers. 
Profile by co-operation
Some researchers have also sought to profile the 
degree of co-operation in carrying out the fraud 
(Titus, 1999; and Titus and Gover, 2001). There is also 
what could be described as the ‘careless’ victim. For 
example some identity fraud victims who exhibit 
a degree of carelessness by throwing away bank 
statements also put too much personal information 
on a social networking website or fail to update the 
security on their personal computer. There are also 
some victims warned by financial institutions that 
the transaction they are about to pay for is a scam, 
however they ignore the advice. 
Figure 4
The range of involvement of the victim  
in the fraud
 
The involvement of the victim can be distinguished 
according to the degree of co-operation as set out  
in Figure 4 below. Drawing upon Titus (1999) 
Figure 4 shows the range of involvement by 
victims distinguished according to the degree of 
cooperation. At one end is the completely random 
victim, where there is no co-operation in the fraud 
whatsoever. This could be a company director 
whose personal details are used to make fraudulent 
loan applications. 
At the next level of involvement is ‘some co-operation’, 
where the victim does play a part but is generally 
more ‘passive’ in orientation. For example, someone 
responds to a phishing e-mail who is tricked into 
giving their bank account and other personal details 
or a person cold called by a boiler room and 
persuaded to purchase worthless shares. This 
could also cover a victim of identity fraud who has 
thrown away their bank statements. They have 
played a role in the fraud, but have been unlucky 
that their rubbish has been targeted by a fraudster. 
Finally there is ‘considerable co-operation’ where 
the victim is more involved in the fraud and may 
even show a degree of pro-active involvement.  
For example, responding to an advertisement  
or actually seeking out an investment scheme.  
Some of the victims of home working scams, racing 
tipsters would fit this category. The figure above  
demonstrates these three categories of involvement. 
Some of the types of co-operation have been 
identified by Titus (1999: 2):
• Victim making contact with offender 
(responding to advert, visiting website etc);
• Victim providing information about him/herself; 
• Victim allowing offender to turn business 
relationship into a personal one; 
• Victim allows offender to create false perception 
of situation which can then be exploited 
(believing the lottery has been won);
• Victim reveals personal financial information 
to offender. 
Some		
co-operation
Considerable		
co-operation
No		
co-operation
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The general typology of victims can also be  
mapped according to losses and repeat 
victimisation. In many ways it resembles an iceberg. 
There are a small number of so called ‘chronic’ 
victims, largely succumbing to mass marketing 
scams above the surface at the top, few in number 
but often losing large proportions of their income/
savings (although often in multiples of relatively 
small sums of money) (Shichor et al, 2001; OFT, 
2006). Once a victim responds to a scam they 
are likely to be put on the ‘suckers’ lists and face a 
barrage of further scams. The Fraud Advisory Panel 
(2006) highlighted the case of Lillian Lazonby who 
had been targeted by junk mail scammers and after 
her death, relatives found over 10,000 letters and 
losses of £20k. 
Then there are a large number of victims who may 
have been victims of fraud once or a few occasions, 
but have lost substantial sums of money. Some 
of these may or may not report the fraud. Finally 
there are an even larger number who may or may 
not know they have been a victim, as the sum of 
money lost is very small. 
Figure 5
 Typology of victims by loss
Profile of victims 
The analogy of cancer victims was used to  
describe fraud victims. To gain a deeper insight 
into the victims of fraud it is therefore necessary 
to delve further into the profile of specific types of 
fraud. Appendix 2 highlights some of the research 
on the main profiles of victims to different types 
of frauds. Some of those findings will be explored 
according to the different types of frauds. Before 
this is considered, however, it would be useful to 
examine some key issues related to victimisation 
which can be applied generally. 
There is a common perception, particularly in 
the media, that older people are more likely to 
be the victim of a fraud (Titus, 1999). Indeed, the 
profiles of some victims in appendix 2 show higher 
proportions of victims coming from older age 
groups. However, it is important to distinguish 
between who the fraudsters are targeting, who 
succumb and the actual number of victims across 
different demographic groups. If a fraudster is 
solely targeting older age groups then they are of 
course likely to form the greater number of victims. 
There have been a number of studies in other 
countries that have shown that rather than older 
people, the most likely victims of consumer frauds 
is in fact younger people. Titus et al (1995) in a 
national survey of fraud victims in the USA found 
older people were three times less likely to be 
victims of fraud. Another smaller scale study in the 
USA also found that the younger were more likely 
to become victims of fraud (Van Wyk and Benson, 
1997). In Australia Muscat et al (2002) drawing 
upon data from the Australian Crime Victims survey 
found younger people to be at greater risk of fraud, 
with 9.3 per 100 persons of 16-64 years compared 
to 3.9 for 65 years and over victims of consumer 
fraud. They found lifestyle factors such as an active 
social life and working to be more important, 
as they exposed individuals to greater risk of 
fraudulent transactions. However, compared to 
other crimes, consumer fraud is a much higher risk 
than other crimes for the elderly: 2.2 times more 
Chronic
victims
Large	scale	
victims
Small	scale
and	unknown
victims
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frequent than assault, 2.4 more times than theft 
and 13 times more than robbery (Caracach  
et al, 2001). 
Research has also shown that those who have a 
positive attitude to financial risk taking are more 
likely to be targeted as victims of fraud (Van Wyk 
and Benson, 1997). There is also evidence that 
persons with low self-control – who are often 
prepared to engage in a range of risky behaviours 
to seek instant gratification - are also more prone  
to victimisation (Holtfreter et al, 2008). 
Mass marketing and investment frauds 
Appendix 2 illustrates the profile of the different 
types of victims to a range of scams, and their 
median losses (largely drawn from OFT, 2006). 
However, it is challenging to ascertain the numbers 
and range of individuals targeted by the fraudster. 
This makes it difficult to determine whether specific 
groups are more susceptible to fraud. 
 
1. Scams which men tend to fall for:
African advanced fee frauds, internet dialler scams, 
high risk investments, and property investment. 
2. Scams which women tend to fall for: 
Internet matrix, Miracle health and slimming cure 
scams, clairvoyant and psychic scams, and career 
opportunity scams. 
3. Scams the old tend to fall for: 
High risk investments and doorstep service 
providers. 
4. Scams the young tend to fall for:
Work at home and business opportunities, 
clairvoyant and psychic scams, and Internet 
dialler scams.
5. The biggest scams (costs to society):
Bogus holiday clubs scams, high risk investments, 
pyramid selling and chain letters, and foreign 
lottery scams (as identified in appendix 2 according 
to the total costs to society estimated by OFT, 
2006). 
6. The biggest scams  
(by individual median loss)
African advanced fee, high risk investments (there 
are some chronic victims who large sums by 
responding to multiple scams. 
What is striking about of the scams is that the 
profiles cover almost everybody; hence almost 
anyone could become the victim of a scam. 
Identity fraud 
There have been several studies that have sought 
to measure the impact of identity fraud and profile 
their victims. Research by the Home Office has 
estimated it costs the UK economy over £1.2 billion 
and there are over 100,000 victims costing every 
adult £25 per year (cited in Pascoe et al, 2006; and 
Identity Fraud Steering Group, 2008). This illustrates 
that anyone can become the victim of identity 
fraud, but there are certain groups who appear to 
be more at risk than others. 
Research for CIFAS based upon all 55,548 victims of 
impersonation on their records as well as a survey 
of some of them revealed some of the following 
key findings. 
•	 67	per	cent	male,	32	per	cent	female
•	 31-40	years	old	28	per	cent
•	 41-50	years	old	23	per	cent	
•	 64+	years	old	13	per	cent	
•	 Largest	number	of	victims	living	in	London,	
but	higher	per	capita	rates	in	Manchester		
and	Nottingham.	
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A survey was also carried out resulting in some key 
findings: 
•	 Three-quarters	of	victims	had	been	the	victim	
of	more	than	one	offence	
•	 Victims	in	the	31-40	age	bracket	were	most	
likely	to	be	repeat	victims	
•	 51	per	cent	didn’t	know	how	the	fraudster	
obtained	their	documents.	
Experian (2008) has conducted a much deeper 
analysis into some of the 10,000+ victims of 
identity fraud. It found the typical victim of identity 
fraud was: 
•	 26-45	years	old
•	 Working	in	a	professional	occupation	
•	 Owner/occupier	(usually	in	a	detached	house)	
•	 Earning	over	£50,000	(these	are	3	times	more	
likely	to	be	victims)
•	 Directors	of	companies.
The evidence would suggest that fraudsters tend to 
target – for obvious reasons – those likely to have 
higher credit ratings, where their chances of both 
rewards and success are greater. Targeting those 
on lower salaries runs the risk that the application 
might be rejected and second that the potential 
credit offered may be lower. 
Using their client classification system, the 
‘corporate top dogs’, those running businesses, 
high up in large organisations were the most at risk 
group. Directors of companies are also at high risk 
of becoming victims of fraud; with those from large 
companies becoming five and a half times more 
likely and those in organisations with less than 50 
employees, two and a half times more likely. 
They were also able to profile the most at risk 
locations, all of which were desirable locations 
in London: 
•	 Kensington,	Richmond-upon-Thames,	
Putney,	Wimbledon	and	Kings	Road	(Chelsea).
 This was believed to be due to the large number 
of affluent people who frequent restaurants, clubs, 
and other services, providing opportunities for 
fraudsters to gain appropriate information. Outside 
of the M25 the 10 most at risk locations were: 
•	 St	Albans,	Guildford,	Windsor,	Woking,	
Camberley,	Maidenhead,	Redhill,	Bracknell,	
Bishops	Storford	and	Horsham.	
Experian also offered analysis of the average costs 
of each fraud. In these types of fraud it is generally 
the corporate body that faces the financial loss, 
rather than the victim. Although there are a 
number of ways they lose out for example,  
in time lost and credit rating, to name a few.  
The average loss for all was £1,303, but this did  
vary with mail order companies £219, higher 
purchase £28,424, loan providers £7,556 and  
credit and store cards £1,365. 
Low reporting of frauds 
Virtually all identity frauds are reported, it is more 
a question of how soon they are reported. This is 
because actual attacks on the victims’ accounts or 
attempts at securing credit trigger an enquiry that 
leads to the discovery. Thus someone who rarely 
seeks credit who has not had their own accounts 
targeted might take some time to discover they 
are a victim. For mass marketing and investment 
frauds, however, reporting is generally very low – 
approximately 1 to 3 per cent report. 
Appendix 2 also highlights some of the statistics 
on the reporting of frauds. It shows that although 
there is a variation in mass marketing frauds, levels 
of reporting are generally very low. The literature 
on fraud victimisation offers a number of reasons 
for low reporting. 
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Don’t know
Some victims don’t know they are victims of fraud 
thus don’t report them. 
Perception partly responsible 
Many victims hold themselves partly or solely 
to blame and as a consequence are reluctant to 
report it. Indeed Mason and Benson (1996) found 
those victims who blamed themselves or the 
offender and themselves, were much less likely to 
report. 
Embarrassment 
Linked to perceptions of responsibility some 
victims feel embarrassed and do not want family 
members and outsiders to know of their loss. 
Low financial Loss
Several researchers have found that relatively small 
fraud losses make reporting less likely (Mason and 
Benson, 1996; Copes et al, 2001). 
Ambiguity of fraud 
Some frauds are designed to be legally ambiguous. 
This means once the victim realises it is a scam, it 
may be difficult to secure the interest of the law 
enforcement community. Some scams, such as 
investment frauds, are ambiguous in the sense 
some victims think it was just a bad investment 
rather than a scam. 
The criminal justice process
A common perception for victims’ low reporting 
of fraud is the perception that criminal justice 
agencies do not take them seriously (Mason and 
Benson, 1996; Titus, 1999). There has been rigorous 
evidence to support this perception. A study of 
consumer fraud victims in Florida found that one 
of the most significant reasons for low reporting 
was low confidence in the ability of legal bodies 
to respond to victimisation. Less than half of those 
surveyed had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a bit’ 
of confidence in legal authorities to deal with 
fraud victimisation (Reisig and Holtfreter, 2007). 
This compares to other studies on the police 
which tend to show around three-quarters have 
confidence in their ability to solve and prevent 
crime. There is also evidence in the USA of the 
unequal treatment of victims enshrined in law 
with lesser opportunities to outline the impact of 
the fraud in court proceedings as well as access to 
restitution (Dee, 2000). 
Confusion 
Some victims are confused over to whom to report 
the fraud. This might be made worse if they go 
to the police and are told it is a ‘civil matter’ or to 
speak to another agency, who in turn then may 
refer them elsewhere or to another body. 
Social networks 
Another important factor in whether a victim 
reports their fraud is related to the social networks 
they belong to and their attitudes towards the 
fraud. Mason and Benson (1996) in a survey of 
residents in Knox County, Tennessee found as a 
significant factor in whether a person reported a 
fraud, was whether their social network (family, 
friends) encouraged them to do so or not. 
Engaging with the Law 
In one study in the USA an attempt was made at 
linking ‘Black’s theory of law’ to reporting behaviour 
for fraud (Copes et al, 2001). This theory holds there 
are a series of factors which make individuals more 
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likely to invoke the law in an activity they  
are pursuing. These include factors such as: 
•	 Strata:	those	in	higher	strata	use	the	law		
more	than	those	in	lower.	
•	 Morphology:	strangers	are	more	likely		
to	use	the	law	than	intimates.
•	 Culture:	where	there	is	more	culture	there		
is	more	law	involved	(more	education,		
literacy	etc).	
•	 Organisation:	greater	organisation	leads		
to	greater	use	of	the	law.	
•	 Social	control:	if	certain	measures	used	to	
secure	social	control	will	have	an	impact		
on	others,	thus	more	custom	will	mean	less		
law,	and	vice	versa.	
The researchers treated reporting fraud as 
equivalent to engaging the law and found 
morphology and culture to be significant 
predictors of fraud reporting. They also found 
the size of the fraud a factor; the greater the size 
of the loss, the more likely a report. Interestingly, 
they found income earned was not a significant 
predictor. 
Impact upon the victim
In this section of the review the impact of fraud 
upon the victim will be considered. The literature 
on fraud highlights some of the devastating 
consequences some frauds have on the victim. 
Such is the impact some have claimed they actually 
feel like they have been raped (Deem, 2000: 37).
Financial 
The most obvious consequence is a financial loss. 
For some victims of fraud such is the loss that it 
results in them having to sell assets (often their 
home), to go back to work (if they were retired), 
or not being able to secure credit. In the worst 
cases victims even become bankrupt. The National 
Institute of Justice research on victims of fraud in 
the USA found 20 per cent suffered financial or 
credit problems as a direct result of the fraud  
(cited by Deem, 2000). 
It is not just the actual financial loss that may  
have an impact upon the victim, it is also the  
time taken to deal with it. It has been estimated  
it takes 48 hours on average for the typical victim 
of identity fraud to clear their name (cited in Fraud 
Advisory Panel, 2006). Research by Pascoe et al has 
suggested that for most victims they can spend 
between 3 and 48 hours rectifying their situation 
(actual time taken which might be over a longer 
period of days/weeks). Appendix 2 highlights the 
median losses across a range of mass marketing, 
investment and identity frauds. It must be noted 
the low figures hide some victims who have lost 
substantial sums of money. 
Employment 
For some victims who are self-employed, the 
consequences of fraud against their business 
might result in it failing and consequent loss of 
employment. 
Emotional impact 
A study of the impact of identity fraud found some 
victim’s emotions were affected. Some became 
worried about someone accessing their personal 
details. Others became agitated and distressed. 
For some this led to feelings of violation, stress 
and anger (Pascoe et al, 2006). Research on mass 
marketing scams has also found some victims 
suffer stress, anxiety and loss of self-esteem  
(OFT, 2006). 
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Health problems 
The impact of fraud can also lead to a range of 
health problems, both physical and mental. Spalek 
(1999) in a study on the victims of the Maxwell 
pension fraud found that ‘anger’ was a common 
emotional impact of the fraud. She also found they 
suffered stress, anxiety and fear as a result of their 
loss. A study of victims of a Ponzi scheme found 
many were afflicted with depression (Ganzini et 
al, 1990). These conditions often then feed into an 
impact upon the physical health of the victims. 
Spalek (1999) also found that some of the victims  
of the Maxwell fraud felt their husband’s deaths 
were accelerated as a result of the scam. Such is  
the consequences for some victims they attempt 
to actually commit suicide. 
Social disintegration of family
The loss of wealth and sometimes the way in 
which the money has been lost (ie often hidden 
from partners) can often lead to the breaking up 
of marriages and relationships. Such is the nature 
of some chronic scams and their effect on victims. 
When family members try to intervene to stop 
them from engaging with the fraudster it leads to  
a disintegration of their relationships. 
Self-blame 
A common theme amongst some victims of rape 
and other violence is that the victims partly blame 
themselves. There is evidence for this amongst 
fraud victims as well (Titus and Gover, 2001). 
Behavioural changes 
For some victims the impact of the crime changes 
their behaviour. Spalek (1999) found victims of the 
Maxwell pension fraud changed their perceptions 
on activities to which they previously felt they were 
invulnerable. She found some victims changed 
their behaviour as to where they might place their 
money. The OFT study of mass marketing fraud 
found over half the scam victims studied had 
changed their purchasing and payment behaviour 
(OFT, 2006). There is also evidence of some victims 
less likely to make use of the internet for purchases. 
Some of these changes could be seen as positive 
in terms of reducing the risk of fraud, but if some 
changes become too widespread this may have  
an impact on legitimate business. 
Impact on wider business community 
Another wider consequence of many frauds is it 
undermines trust in certain business practices. 
Internet fraud may make people reluctant to use 
it to purchase goods (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2006). 
Many people may become less likely to engage 
with legitimate telemarketers and mass marketing 
mail, penalizing the legitimate companies  
(OFT, 2006). 
Plural provision 
This review has illustrated the diverse nature of 
fraud. The diversity is also reflected in the plurality 
of organisations involved with helping victims 
from both the public, private and third sectors. 
This presents challenges in both victims finding 
the best place to report to and organisations 
in supplying the appropriate service without 
duplication. 
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Impact on wider business community 
There are certain crimes whereby the sensitivity 
of their nature can often prevent the victim 
from reporting it to the authorities. It was not so 
long ago that those who suffered at the hands 
of domestic violence faced a similar scenario - 
domestic violence was something that occurred 
‘behind closed doors’. There was simply no 
encouragement to report such matters and 
therefore victims were entirely dissuaded from
doing so and made to feel that they shouldn’t. 
However, recognition of domestic violence as a 
serious criminal act now ensures that its victims
are no longer overlooked by the enforcement and 
support communities. The same cannot currently 
be said for fraud victims. The embarrassment that
is attached to ‘falling for a scam’ is a key reason that 
prevents many victims from reporting. Moreover, if 
someone does choose to report a fraud committed 
against them. Who do they report it to? The police, 
OFT, CAB, FSA, Consumer Direct to name some. 
Once they decide who to approach one of them 
they then might face a response such as, ‘this is 
not our responsibility’ (particularly from the police 
outside the City of London and London) or be 
referred elsewhere. They might also receive an 
unsympathetic response or worse even blamed. 
They are also reporting in an environment where 
there has until the formation of the NFA, been 
little interest in the standards of provision for fraud 
victims or pressure to enhance performance. There 
are also no clear national standards or protocols 
applied to fraud. Thus in an area where there 
are challenges to deal with victims for fraud the 
environment is much harder. 
 Mass marketing/
Identity investment
Company	(bank,	credit	card,	
mobile	phone,	UK	Payments,	
etc)
Credit	agency	
CIFAS	
Statutory	(police,	SFO,	FSA)
Victim	Support,	
Help	the	Aged	
(Specialist:	Ecrime.org)
CPS	
Statutory	(police,	SFO,	FSA,
OFT,	Consumer	Direct,	local	
authority
Private	(CAB,	trade	
association,	etc)	
Victim	Support,
Help	the	Aged
(Specialist:	ThinkJessica)
CPS
It is also worth illustrating the plurality of provision 
by highlighting the wide range of organisations 
that can become involved with victims of fraud. 
Figure 6
Providers of support to victims
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What do victims want? 
The limited research that has been undertaken on 
victims has provided some analysis of what victims 
of fraud actually want. Some of the most common 
issues will now be explored. 
 
Individual case worker 
Pascoe et al (2006) in a review of victims of identity 
fraud have suggested many victims want an 
individual case worker to deal with their case from 
when a report is filed, through to court (should it 
reach that far). Added to this is the complication 
of multiple agencies involved in the process, 
which makes it even more difficult for victims to 
comprehend the process, particularly the more 
vulnerable. 
Kept up-to-date on the progress  
of the case 
A common theme amongst victims of almost 
any crime is a desire to be kept up-to-date with 
the progress of the case. Victims want to know 
if its been investigated if the culprits have been 
identified, have they been charged, were they 
found guilty and if so what was their sentence 
(Pascoe et al 2006). 
Service providers to adopt 
a more sympathetic approach 
The section above demonstrated that many 
victims of fraud do not report. For some of them, 
it is because of the attitudes they face when they 
attempt to report. The nature of some frauds 
lead to questions concerning whether the case is 
actually a crime, if it is the responsibility of another 
agency. Thus for many victims simply been treated 
with sympathy is important (Pascoe et al, 2006). 
Staff better trained in how  
to deal with victims 
There are many people dealing with fraud victims 
who have no specialist knowledge of fraud. Frauds 
are complex and diverse and it is not possible to 
create a ‘one size fits all’ fix for fraud, which meets 
the needs of all victims. For example, a person  
who has been subjected to an identity fraud, not 
only has needs related to the emotional impact, 
but also specialist needs of restoring credit ratings 
and avoiding further victimisation. A victim of 
chronic scams who is elderly and convinced the 
lotteries entered are real, thus denying they are 
even a victim, and who as a consequence has fallen 
out with family members. Trying to stop them has 
a completely different set of needs. Staff involved 
in this area therefore need to be trained in general 
principles of victim support, as well as more 
specialist areas, particularly if they are looking to 
provide services to all types of fraud victims  
(Pascoe et al, 2006). 
Better and clearer information
There are some victims who report who may 
receive no information. On the other hand, there 
are others who will be provided with extensive 
resources. There is lots of guidance available to 
victims of fraud in the forms of leaflets, websites, 
DVDs etc produced by some of the wide range of 
bodies involved. Many examples of best practice 
can be found by utilising the best resources 
with the clearest messages, which would be 
advantageous for many victims (Pascoe et al, 2006). 
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Restitution and compensation 
For victims of identity fraud, once fraud has been 
proven and there is no evidence of negligence 
funds are usually restored if they have been stolen. 
There may, however, be other costs that are borne 
by the victim, for which individuals would like 
compensation. For many of the other types of fraud 
restitution is not only difficult but very unlikely 
(Fraud Review Team, 2006; and Pascoe et al, 2006). 
Not to be victimised 
A priority for many victims is not to be targeted 
again by fraudsters. Clearly the evidence from the 
criminals is that once a person has become a victim 
of fraud they are at high risk of being victimised 
again. Therefore measures that can be taken to 
make this less likely are also important for victims 
(Fraud Review Team, 2006). 
Offender punished 
A simple desire for many victims is for the person 
who committed the fraud to be brought to 
justice and punished (Fraud Review Team, 2006). 
As has already been alluded to, for many frauds, 
investigation is unlikely, let alone a successful 
investigation, verdict and punishment. 
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Conclusion
This review has illustrated the diversity 
of frauds that affect individuals and 
small businesses. Some of the frauds and 
scams that are used by fraudsters were 
considered, along with the techniques 
they use to perpetrate them. 
A brief overview of those who commit the frauds 
was provided and a description of them as 
‘scampreneurs’ established. The review then went 
on to examine the victims, providing some of the 
different typologies that have been developed. 
Analysis was provided drawing upon the research 
of a range of studies, profiling the different types 
of fraud victims. The review then went on to 
explore why some do not report frauds, along with 
the impact of them upon the individual. Finally, 
the review assessed the current infrastructure for 
victims of fraud, illustrating the plural provisions 
and ending with an overview of what victims want. 
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Glossary
Boiler Rooms – a term used to describe a hub 
of sales-persons usually engaging in high pressure 
selling of worthless investments or other items. 
‘Boiler’ is used because of the high pressure. 
Phishing – emails sent out with the purpose 
of tricking the target into revealing personal data 
which can then be used by the fraudster. 
419 Scams – scams where the person is tricked 
into engaging in what seems like an illegitimate 
scam by a corrupt official in another country to 
launder money for which they will receive a share. 
An advanced fee needs to be paid to start the 
process and the victim never sees that or the loot. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1. 
The techniques of fraudsters
Type of scam Use of latest 
technology
Professional 
and legitimate 
appearance
Illegitimate
appearance
Small print Good sales pitch Selling dream Legal 
hinterland 
Intimidation 
and violence 
Gambling
Prizedraw	and
sweepstake
scams
P P P P
Foreign
lottery	scams
P P P P
Bogus	tipsters P P P P
Money 
making
Pyramid	selling
and	chain
letter	scams
P P P
Internet	
matrix	scams
P P
Bogus 
products
and services
Miracle	
health	and	
slimming	cure	
scams
P P P P
Premium	
rate	and	
telephone	
prize	scams
P P
Clairvoyant	
and	psychic	
mailing	scams
P P P P
Career	
opportunity	
scams
P P P
Loan	scams P P
Illicit scams
African	
advanced	fee	
frauds/foreign	
making	scams
P P
Technological 
trick scams
Internet	dialler	
scams	
P
High	risk P P P
Property	
investment
P P P
Identity
Identity	fraud P
Source: OFT (2006), Pascoe et al (2006), Experian (2008).
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Appendix 2. 
Victim profiles
Type of scam Victim profile Report Number
of victims
Financial impact 
individual
Total financial
impact annually 
Gambling
Prizedraw	and	
sweepstake	scams
Female	(57%)
35-64	(66%)
Low	reporting
to	police	(2%)
380,000 £33	median £60	million
Foreign
lottery	scams
Male	(53%)
35-64	(58%)
65+	(24%)
Low	reporting
to	police	(3%)	or	to	
local	authority	(2%)
140,000 £42	median £260	million
Bogus	tipsters £5	million
Money 
making
Work	at	home	
and	business
opportunity	scams
Female	(53%)
35-64	(61%)
under	34	(29%)
Low	reporting	to	OFT/
local	authority	(2%)	
or	to	police	(1%)
330,000 £43	median £70	million
Internet	
matrix	scams
Female	(61%)
35-64	(70%)
No	reports	
to	authorities
70,000 £53	median £10	million
Bogus 
products
and services
Miracle	health	and	
slimming	cure	scams
Female	(78%)
35-64	(70%)
Low	reporting	to	any
statutory	body	(1%)
200,000 £46	median £20	million
Premium	rate	and	
telephone	prize	scams
Male	(53%)
35-64	(68%)
Low	reporting
to	BT	(2%)	and	
police	(1%)
1.08	million £14	median £80	million
Clairvoyant	and	
psychic	mailing	scams
Female	(70%)
34	and	younger	(31%)
Low	reporting	to
statutory	agency	(1%)
170,000 £36	median £40	million
Career	opportunity	
scams
Female	(65%)
35-64	(65%)
under	34	(26%)
No	reporting	
to	authorities
70,000 £155	median £30	million
Loan	scams Female	(53%)
35-64	(66%)
65+	(18%)
Low	reporting	to	
police	(3%),	CAB	(3%),	
Bank	(2%)	and	DTI	(1%)
110,000 £376	median £190	million
Illicit scams
African	advanced	
fee	frauds/foreign	
making	scams
Male	(64%)
35-64	(69%)
Low	reporting,	but	
higher	than	average	
to	police	(9%)
70,000 £2858	median £340	million
Investment frauds
High	risk Male	(71%)
65+	(34%)
Medium	9%	to	police
and	5%	to	OFT
90,000 £2751	median £490	million
Property	
investment
Male	(65%)
35-64	(76%)
London	(25%)
Very	low	45	to	police 40,000 £251	median
(but	4,240	mean)
£160	million
Identity
Identity	fraud Male	26-45
Professional	director
Very	high 100,000 £1303 £1.2	billion
Source: OFT (2006), Pascoe et al (2006), Experian (2008), Identity Fraud Steering Group (2008)
Note: Where there are gaps, there was no information available of sufficient quality to enter.
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